Abstract: At the present stage,the problem that many traditional villages cannot get financial funds for protection and construction is widespread,and the village and the people's association as the financing subject can effectively solve this problem by financing the society.However,in the process of financing,the inconsistency between the economic interests of the villagers and the investors,as well as the imperfection and imperfection of the information of both sides will bring many problems to the financing.Using the dynamic game model of incomplete and imperfect information in game theory,the internal mechanism of the financing behavior between the two sides,that is,the main reason that hinders the village and the people's association from financing is the private attribute of the output income information of the traditional village,are discussed.Three suggestions are given,which are to overcome the information asymmetry,to perfect and standardize the construction of traditional villages,to improve social security and eliminate the negative benefits of villagers,so as to provide reference for the financing of the protection and construction of traditional villages.