基于信息不对称视角下的传统村落建设融资博弈分析

王颂; 唐鹏晨

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1003-0972.2019.02.029

基于信息不对称视角下的传统村落建设融资博弈分析

王颂^,,
唐鹏晨

信阳师范学院建筑与土木工程学院, 河南信阳 464000

基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目（41807240）；河南省高等学校重点科研项目（18A560021）；河南省研究生教育教学改革研究与实践项目（2017SJGLX105Y）

详细信息

作者简介:
王颂(1973-),女,河南信阳人,副教授,硕士,主要从事传统村落保护与建设管理研究.

中图分类号: TU398
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- 文章访问数: 1205
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出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2018-05-01
- 修回日期: 2019-01-26
- 发布日期: 2019-04-09

Game Analysis of Traditional Village Construction Financing Based on Asymmetric Information

WANG Song^,,
TANG Pengchen

College of Architecture and Civil Engineering, Xinyang Normal University, Xinyang 464000, China

摘要

摘要: 现阶段，许多传统村落得不到财政资金来进行保护建设的问题普遍存在，而以村-民联合体作为融资主体，通过向社会进行融资可以有效解决这一难题.但是，村落村民在融资过程中与投资方的经济利益目标的不一致以及双方信息的不完美、不完全，会给融资带来诸多的问题.运用博弈论中不完全并且不完美信息的动态博弈模型，讨论双方发生融资行为的内在机理，即阻碍村-民联合体进行融资的最主要的原因是因为传统村落的产出收益信息的私人属性.给出三个建议：克服信息不对称、完善规范传统村落建设行为、提升保障福利消除村民负效益，以期为传统村落保护建设中如何融资提供借鉴.
- 信息不对称 /
- 传统村落 /
- 融资 /
- 博弈
Abstract: At the present stage,the problem that many traditional villages cannot get financial funds for protection and construction is widespread,and the village and the people's association as the financing subject can effectively solve this problem by financing the society.However,in the process of financing,the inconsistency between the economic interests of the villagers and the investors,as well as the imperfection and imperfection of the information of both sides will bring many problems to the financing.Using the dynamic game model of incomplete and imperfect information in game theory,the internal mechanism of the financing behavior between the two sides,that is,the main reason that hinders the village and the people's association from financing is the private attribute of the output income information of the traditional village,are discussed.Three suggestions are given,which are to overcome the information asymmetry,to perfect and standardize the construction of traditional villages,to improve social security and eliminate the negative benefits of villagers,so as to provide reference for the financing of the protection and construction of traditional villages.
- asymmetric information /
- traditional village /
- financing /
- game

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参考文献(12)

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